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INTRODUCTION 
There is a considerable debate amongst the public, policymakers and academics as to whether 
individual executives matter for firm performance and behaviour. A growing body of research 
demonstrates that executive directors are a heterogeneous group and suggests that executive 
behaviour is governed by more than economic trade-offs. Studies have shown that executives 
affect the performance of firms (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Bennedsen, Perez-
Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2008; Custodio & Metzger, 2013; Kaplan, Klebano, & Sorensen, 2012) 
and their policy choices (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Custodio & Metzger, 2014; 
Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). Other studies argue that individual executives have little 
impact on firm performance and behaviour because seemingly unique executive-specific ‘styles’ 
may in fact be shaped by the board of directors and that new executives are appointed with 
desired characteristics to take a firm in the direction determined by the board (Fee, Hadlock, & 
Pierce, 2013). This study sheds new light on whether and how executives matter by 
demonstrating that variations in observable demographic and experience characteristics of 
executives have market valuation effects. 
With existing work mostly limited to non-financial firms, there is an inherent lack of 
analysis concerning the banking sector. Since banks are complex institutions and may require 
employees with specialised skills (Philippon & Reshef, 2012), selecting the right executives 
could give banks a significant competitive edge as well as contribute to the growth of the 
economy. Recently, the banking sector has received much criticism for its contribution to the 
financial crisis that started in 2007. Many blame incompetent banking executives for engaging in 
activities that endangered the safety and soundness of the financial system and gave rise to 
unprecedented government support of the banking sector. By the same token, certain bank 
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executives have been credited with steering their organisations successfully through the financial 
crisis.
1
  
In this study, we focus on executive directors
2
 who are responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the bank. Since executive directors have substantial discretion over their decisions, 
their individual characteristics such as prior experience could make an important difference to 
bank outcomes (e.g. Kim & Lu, 2014; Landier, Sauvagnat, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2013). In contrast, 
non-executive directors, who are responsible for monitoring and advising the CEOs, are not 
involved in managing the bank on a daily basis. Hence, compared with non-executive directors, 
executives have more influence and their characteristics are more likely to have measurable 
implications for the market performance of banks.  
 We argue that executive characteristics such as age, education, and employment history 
are performance relevant. In our analysis, we examine whether the stock market reaction to the 
appointment of a new executive is driven by the characteristics of the appointee. Focusing on the 
appointment of a new executive offers an appropriate setting in which to examine the value of 
characteristics that the appointee brings to the hiring bank. In an efficient capital market, the 
market reaction is indicative of the anticipated future performance conditional on relevant 
information (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988). Thus, market returns will 
be higher when an appointee with desirable characteristics is hired because investors believe that 
this appointee will improve performance. In this study, we do not look at internal appointments 
of executives because the identification of any causal effects between appointee characteristics 
and announcement returns are not straightforward in this case. From a resource-based 
perspective, the marginal addition in terms of human capital to the firm is likely to be smaller 
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when internal candidates (who, most likely, already contribute to bank decision-making in senior 
positions) are appointed compared to an externally appointed director. 
Our sample consists of 252 executive appointment announcements by 145 US banks. 
Exploring this dataset, we examine whether the stock market reaction to the appointment 
announcement is affected by seven characteristics of the appointee: (1) age, (2) gender, (3) the 
number of prior executive directorships, (4) the number of current non-executive directorships 
(busyness), (5) the number of non-banking industries (in which the appointee has experience), 
(6) an Ivy League education and (7) an MBA degree. 
There are two main econometric challenges we face in our analysis. First, a bank’s 
decision to make a top executive appointment could be driven by endogenous factors, e.g., when 
a bank is not performing well and faces shareholder pressure to improve performance by making 
new appointments (Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Fee et al., 2013). We therefore exclude 
appointments where the press coverage indicates an appointment followed investor 
dissatisfaction with management or corporate strategy. The second challenge is that, since we are 
interested in the expected performance effects linked to a new appointment, our sample only 
contains single appointment announcements which involve external appointments (i.e., 
executives who have previously not worked for the sample bank). This might introduce a 
selection bias when the decision to make a single (rather than multiple) appointment 
announcement or the decision to choose an external (rather than an internal) appointee correlates 
with factors associated with announcement returns. We address this second challenge using the 
Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and the findings we report in this paper are robust to 
controlling for selection bias.  
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Our key findings are as follows. First, announcement returns following appointments are 
statistically positive, suggesting that the addition of top managers, on average, is valuable for US 
banks. Second, we examine whether the market reaction to executive appointments is influenced 
by characteristics of the executive. Overall, our findings suggest that the age, education and prior 
experience of the executives create shareholder wealth in the US banking sector. In contrast, 
gender, non-banking experience or an MBA degree do not lead to any measurable market 
returns. In addition, the appointment of executives who hold non-executive directorships with 
outside firm at the time of the appointment results in negative returns, consistent with the 
hypothesis that busy executives have less attention to focus on an individual bank (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006).  
Third, our analysis of interaction terms shows that the wealth effects linked to executive 
characteristics are moderated by how much influence the incoming executive is expected to hold 
over the bank. Thus, the expected performance effects of top executives are reduced as bank 
boards become more independent. By contrast, the expected performance effects are higher for 
CEOs, confirming that the CEO is the most important decision-maker in the bank.  
Overall, our study makes three significant contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to a growing literature that uses manager fixed effects to address the question of how 
important executive ‘styles’ are to various corporate outcomes (Adams et al., 2005; Bamber, 
Jiang, & Wang, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Frank & Goyal, 2007; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 
2012). It is empirically challenging to quantify the effects of individual executives on firm 
performance. Fee et al. (2013) argue that executive turnover, which forms the empirical basis to 
work out executive styles, may frequently be endogenous (e.g., when they follow a period of 
underperformance). When focusing on ‘exogenous’ CEO replacements brought about by CEO 
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retirements and deaths, the authors do not find evidence of manager fixed effects in corporate 
policy choices. This raises the question whether or not the results of the manager styles literature 
are biased and that whether, more broadly, executives matter for corporate outcomes.  
Our paper offers an alternative route to showing that executives indeed matter. Unlike 
Fee et al. (2013) we do not focus on executive ‘styles’, but on demographic and experience 
variables of executives. We show that the majority of executive appointments are linked to value 
gains around the announcement date. By analysing the variation in short-term returns following 
executive appointments, we can exclude events other than the appointment causing the observed 
effect. We thus interpret our results as evidence demonstrating that it matters who bank 
executives are in a similar way that much of the executive styles literature demonstrates.  
Second, we provide direct empirical evidence on the value of top executive 
characteristics in the US banking sector. We are unaware of any published research that looks at 
the value of top executives in the banking sector. Since the banking sector is relatively opaque, 
complex and skill-intensive (Philippon & Reshef, 2012), we contribute towards uncovering the 
‘black box’ of desirable characteristics top corporate leaders should possess to affect 
performance in the banking sector. In addition, our findings add to the current debate on the 
value of generalist versus specialist managerial experience in banking. While many studies 
recognise the growing importance of general managerial experience (Custodio, Ferreira, & 
Matos, 2013; Lazear, 2004), we show that cross-industry experience is not value-relevant to US 
bank shareholders. 
Third, our paper contributes to the scant literature on governance inside the top 
management team. Despite the central roles CEOs and other executives play in managing the 
company, there are surprisingly few studies that focus on top executives (e.g., Berger et al., 
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2014; Landier et al., 2013; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). Recently, Kim and Lu (2014) show how 
strengthening board independence weakens executive suite independence, which is proxied by 
the fraction of executives appointed before the current CEO. We similarly focus on the interplay 
between the boards and top management teams and demonstrate that board independence 
weakens the expected performance effects linked to certain executive characteristics.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys major theoretical and empirical 
evidence and develops our primary hypotheses, followed by a section describing our sample and 
empirical strategy. We then present our empirical results and conclude the paper.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical background  
Much research in both non-financial and financial firms has devoted considerable attention to 
studying the board of directors.
3
 For example, recent studies analyse the effects of board size on 
firm value (e.g., Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008), the optimal balance between non-executive 
and executive directors (e.g., Dahya & McDonnell, 2007; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004), the impact 
of board diversity on firm value (e.g., Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003), or the value of firm-level governance practices (e.g., Van Essen, 
Engelen, & Carney, 2013; Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009). There is also a stream of research 
that looks at the impact of gender diversity on firm performance (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Farrell & 
1
Hersch, 2005; Rose, 2007; Singh, Vinnicombe & Johnson, 2001). In the banking 
industry, Adams and Mehran (2012) and Andres and Vallelado (2008) show some evidence that 
bank board structure is relevant for bank performance. 
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However, relatively little attention has been paid to top executives who are responsible 
for managing the bank on a daily basis. There remains considerable uncertainty around whether 
or not individual executives matter for corporate outcomes. Thus, neoclassical economics 
assumes that individuals are homogeneous and different executives are perfect substitutes for 
each other. Agency theory, while acknowledging that executives may pursue different courses of 
action to advance their personal interests, sees executive actions shaped by the quality of 
corporate governance in the organisation.  
In contrast, the management literature and Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons 
theory suggests that individual characteristics matter. Upper echelons theory argues that 
executives’ idiosyncratic experiences affect their interpretations of strategic decision-making 
situations and, in turn, affect their strategic choices and performance levels. Upper echelons 
theory predicts individual differences among executives will be most salient when the decision-
making situations are complex and ambiguous as would be the case for banking organisations.  
To summarise, existing theories make contradicting predictions regarding whether 
executives matter for firm outcomes. To shed light on this issue, we use variations in observable 
demographic and experience characteristics of executives to answer two key empirical questions: 
(1) whether executives matter and (2) how executives matter.  
 
Executive characteristics and bank performance  
In this section, we explain how demographic and experience characteristics of executives affect 
the announcement returns. The characteristics we focus on are (1) age, (2) gender, (3) the 
number of prior executive directorships, (4) the number of current non-executive directorships 
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and (5) the number of non-banking industries (in which the executive has experience), (6) Ivy 
League education and (7) MBA degree.  
Age. The age of the appointees could impact their decision-making capability, risk-taking 
behaviour, career concerns and economic incentives. Compared to younger appointees, older 
ones have more experience in making decisions when they face complex and ambiguous tasks 
(Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer –et al. 2011). Furthermore, older appointees face less career 
uncertainty and have fewer incentives to improve their job security. Thus, they are less likely to 
engage in value-destroying excessively risky activities. For example, Yim (2013) shows that 
older CEOs are less likely to engage in M&A activities and tend to perform better. Hence, older 
appointees could create wealth for bank shareholders. 
However, younger appointees have more energy and drive (Harman, 1991; Roberts & 
Rosenberg, 2006). This could translate into other characteristics such as enthusiasm, decisiveness 
and ambition. In addition, compared to older appointees, younger ones have more ideas, are 
quicker in learning new technologies (Grund & Westergård-Nielsen, 2008) and are able to make 
innovative decisions. With these qualities, younger appointees may create shareholder wealth.  
Gender. Female appointees possess unique skills, experience and networks, allowing 
them to contribute to the functional decision making capability of the bank. In addition, female 
appointees could counterbalance potentially excessive risk-taking behaviour by male colleagues. 
For example, Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2014) document that firms run by female CEOs have 
lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than firms run by male 
CEOs. Since excessive risk-taking could destroy value, the appointment of a female executive 
could create wealth for bank shareholders.  
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However, there is a possibility of conflict between the newly appointed female executive 
and the existing male executives. It may prove difficult for female executives to be listened to on 
an equal basis by other members if there are very few females on the board or in the executive 
suite (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). This could impose psychic costs on the female executive, 
which could result in performance losses (Becker, 1957).  
Empirical results that attempt to link the presence of female executives to firm 
performance are mixed. For example, Lee and James (2007) find a significant negative stock 
market reaction to the news of female CEO appointments while Gupta and Raman (2013) find no 
gender-specific difference in the stock reactions to the news of the CEO appointment or in the 
post-appointment operating performance of firms. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that for 
firms with good corporate governance standards in place, more gender-diverse boards are 
negatively associated with firm performance.  
Prior executive directorships experience. It is possible that there is a unique set of 
skills and managerial abilities acquired by those with prior executive directorships that sets them 
apart from other individuals (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Hence, holding prior executive 
directorships in listed firms signals the appointee’s proven track record and accomplishments. In 
addition, experienced appointees also bring their existing social ties and networks to the bank. 
This places the bank in the networks of other firms, giving it access to various external 
constituencies such as industry regulators (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Looking at 
diversifying M&A, Custodio and Metzger (2013) show that when the acquirer’s CEO has prior 
experience working in the target industry, acquirer’s abnormal announcement returns are higher 
than those generated by a CEO without similar experience.  
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Current non-executive directorships (busyness). The appointment of an executive with 
non-executive directorships could give the bank ‘endorsement benefits’, allowing it access to 
corporate elites and external resources (Fich, 2005; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011).  
However, appointees holding non-executive directorships can be distracted from their 
responsibilities at the bank (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
They might not have the time and energy to fulfil their duties. Multiple directorships have been 
associated with lower board inputs from busy directors (Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, & Ning, 
2009). Bar-Hava, Gu and Lev (2013) show that when busy directors resign from one of the board 
positions, investors of firms which the directors continue to serve react positively to the news. 
Finally, examining US commercial banks, Grove, Patelli, Victoravich and Xu (2011) show that 
the proportion of busy directors has a weak inverted-U relationship with bank performance.  
Experience in non-banking industries. Several studies suggest that general skills 
acquired through experience in a diversified set of industries are becoming increasingly 
important and value-adding (e.g. Cremers & Grinstein, 2013; Custodio et al., 2013; Lazear, 
2004). This allows appointees to make a variety of decisions in different contexts. However, as 
the banking industry is highly specialised, appointees with experience in multiple non-banking 
industries might have fewer specialist financial skills and thus, might be less capable of making 
technical decisions.  
Ivy League education. We choose Ivy League institutions
4
 as an indicator of highly 
reputable universities. While not a perfect proxy for academic excellence, there is empirical 
evidence showing that Ivy League graduates perform better than non-Ivy ones. For example, 
Laderman (1994) finds that during the period from the 1989-1993 period, mutual funds managed 
by Ivy League graduates generally outperform their non-Ivy counterparts. More recently, Falato, 
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Li and Milbourn (2014) demonstrate that CEOs who study at more selective institutions are paid 
at a premium and this effect is associated with talent. In addition, Ivy League graduates often 
have access to certain elite groups including successful businesspeople or experts in their own 
areas.   
However, Ivy League educated appointees might choose to engage only with peers with a 
similar educational background and refuse to collaborate with other members in the executive 
team. This could result in an unhealthy corporate culture where different social groups compete 
for power (Farnum, 1990). Since conflicts of social preference can impose psychic costs on team 
members and lower overall group performance (Becker, 1957), the presence of Ivy League 
educated appointees could destroy shareholder wealth.  
MBA degree. One well-documented benefit of an MBA degree is the extensive social 
links that the appointees form during their MBA study. Appointing executives with an MBA 
degree could place the hiring bank in a more central position in the corporate social networks, 
and this could create value for bank shareholders.  
However, there is no clear empirical evidence suggesting that MBA executives 
outperform non-MBA ones. For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that hedge fund 
managers with an MBA degree do not perform significantly better than those without one. 
Furthermore, McCabe, Butterfield and Trevino (2006) show that self-reported cheating is higher 
in MBA program than in other graduate programs. Since individuals who cheat at school also 
tend to cheat in the workplace (Nonis & Swift 2001), MBA executives might be more likely to 
commit wrongdoing during their tenure at the bank. This could destroy shareholder wealth 
because the losses associated with corporate fraud can be enormous (Karporff, Lee, & Martin, 
2008).   
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Overall, there are arguments for both positive and negative effects linked to the executive 
characteristics we discuss above. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question to see whether 
the director characteristics have positive or negative effects on shareholder wealth.  
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Data 
We examine new appointments of executives to US banks from January 1999 to December 2011. 
We start by obtaining a list of all banks on BoardEx, a leading business intelligence service that 
provides information on executive characteristics. BoardEx covers in excess of 700 US banks 
which is far more than other similar databases which track executives over time, allowing us to 
also include smaller banks into our sample. Recently, several studies have used BoardEx to 
obtain director-level data. For example, Custodio et al. (2013) use it to track the lifetime work 
experience of S&P 1500 CEOs and Van Essen et al. (2013) use it to obtain board characteristics 
of European firms. Since BoardEx covers executive-level information from 1999 onward in good 
detail, our sample period starts in 1999.  
We then use Factiva to search for newspapers articles containing the search terms related 
to executives (‘officer’, ‘executive’ etc.) and appointments (‘appoint’, ‘name’ etc.). To avoid 
missing appointment events, we keep our search terms generic and avoid using specific terms 
such as ‘executive director’. As in Custodio and Metzger (2013), we retain appointments to 
executive positions including CEO, CFO, COO, CRO, CIO, Chairman, President, Division CEO, 
Division President, Division Chairman, Head of Division, Regional CEO, Regional President, 
and Regional Chairman. Some of our executive appointments are simultaneously board 
appointments. This is the case for most CEO appointments and for a limited number of President 
or COO appointments. Since investors could react differently to appointments that mix the hiring 
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of a new executive with board appointments, we will deal with this possibility in subsequent 
sections.  
The event date is defined as the earliest trading day when the announcement is made. In 
the final sample, we impose two exclusion criteria to ensure that the stock market reaction is 
purely driven by the event of the incoming executive appointment. First, we remove all 
appointment announcements that are simultaneously announced with other corporate events (e.g. 
earnings or merger announcements) because the stock market reactions might be confounded by 
the other news items in these cases. Second, we exclude all appointment announcements that are 
made simultaneously with announcements of unplanned executive departures. We exclude these 
announcements, because the stock market reaction to this type of event might be driven by the 
predecessor’s unplanned departure rather than by the incoming executive appointment. Planned 
departures (that is, previously announced executive departures due to retirement) are kept in the 
sample.
5
 We also remove appointment announcements where appointee information cannot be 
retrieved from BoardEx and where daily stock returns are not available from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We then cross-check each announcement with 
information disclosed in BoardEx and in the bank’s financial reports to verify the accuracy of the 
information. 
This generates a set of 658 executive appointment announcements by 308 banks. Our 658 
appointment announcements are classified into three categories: (1) single appointment 
announcements of externally-hired executives (252 cases), (2) single appointment 
announcements of internally-promoted executives (271 cases), and (3) appointment 
announcements where two or more executives are simultaneously appointed (135 cases).  
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Our sample of interest consists of single and externally-hired appointment 
announcements. While differences in the announcement effects for externally- versus internally-
hired directors are an interesting research question, this is beyond the scope of the present study. 
In this study, we restrict our sample to externally-hired executives to enable us to unambiguously 
measure the marginal value effect linked to the inclusion of new executives. Compared to an 
externally appointed director, the marginal addition in terms of human capital to the firm is likely 
to be smaller when internal candidates who already contribute to bank decision-making are 
appointed. Similarly, we cannot separate the announcement effects linked to individual 
executives when multiple executives are simultaneously appointed. However, focusing solely on 
external appointments could introduce a selection bias when banks choose to make external 
appointments over types of appointments. We will deal with this potential selection bias in 
subsequent sections. Table 1 summarises our classification of 658 executive appointment 
announcements. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
We obtain data on appointee characteristics from BoardEx. We first include two basic 
demographic measures: AGE measures the age of the appointee at the time of the appointment 
and FEMALE is a dummy that that equals to 1 if the appointee is a female and 0 otherwise. 
Second, we include three variables that capture the appointee experience and competitiveness in 
the external labour market: #EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS measures the number of 
executive directorships with listed firms that the appointee has held prior to joining the bank. 
BUSYNESS measures the number of non-executive directorships the appointee holds at the time 
of the appointment. #NON-BANKING INDUSTRIES measures the number of non-banking 
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industries (based on 4-digit SIC codes) the appointee has worked in prior to joining the bank. 
Finally, we include two variables that capture executive educational background: IVY LEAGUE 
is a dummy that equals 1 if the appointee obtains at least one degree from Ivy League institutions 
and 0 otherwise and MBA is a dummy that equals 1 if the appointee possesses an MBA degree 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Empirical strategy  
Our main purpose is to investigate how market investors evaluate appointee characteristics using 
the stock market reactions to executive appointments. Since our approach is to employ only 
single appointment announcements involving appointees external to the bank, we face two main 
challenges.  
First, the bank decision to make an executive appointment could be driven by 
endogenous factors, e.g., when it is not performing well and faces shareholder pressures to 
improve its performance by making new appointments (Berger et al., 2014; Fee et al., 2013). The 
stock market reaction to such appointments, therefore, could be driven by investor satisfaction 
with the bank decision to take action rather than the performance effects linked to a new 
appointment. Since we are interested in examining how appointee characteristics are evaluated 
by market investors, we exclude appointment announcements that are made because the bank is 
not performing well. We rely on the contents provided in the press coverage to judge whether an 
appointment is made due to poor performance. In particular, if there is information indicating 
that the appointment is made because the bank is facing ‘disappointing performance’ or trying to 
‘seek a turnaround’ for example, we do not include such appointment announcements in our 
sample. 
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The second challenge is that using only the sample of single and externally-hired 
executive appointment announcements might introduce a selection bias. This happens when the 
decision to make a single external appointment correlates with factors which also explain the 
announcement returns. For example, if underperforming banks are more likely to make single 
external appointment announcements and this causes negative returns, then ignoring this 
possibility will bias our estimates.  
By observing single external appointments jointly with other appointment types (i.e., 
multiple executive appointments and single, internal executive appointments), we are able to 
address this problem using the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. In the first step, we 
construct a probit model to estimate the probability that the bank will make a single and 
externally-hired executive appointment announcement. We let a dummy variable be equal to 1 if 
the bank makes a single external announcement and 0 otherwise. The value of q would be 
determined by:  
q = *Z +  
where Z contains appointee-level and bank-level variables that may influence the bank’s 
decision to make a single and externally-hired appointment. The predicted individual 
probabilities obtained in the probit model are then used to calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio for 
inclusion in the second-stage model as an additional explanatory variable (Heckman, 1979). 
Essentially, this procedure allows us to take into account the potential selection bias when banks 
choose to make a single external appointment instead of other appointment types. In the second-
step, we estimate the following regression model to examine the effects of appointee 
characteristics on the announcement returns: 
5-day CAR (%) = α + β1 appointee characteristics + β2 control variables + β3
)(
)(
q
q


  + ε  
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The second-step regression can now be updated by including the term )(/)( qq   in the 
regression, where )(/)( qq  is the inverse Mill’s ratio (Heckman, 1979). The dependent 
variables are 5-day CAR (%) around the announcement of a single externally-hired executive 
appointment. Appointee characteristics measures are defined as previously. Control variables 
refer to a set of variables that we include to ensure that our results on appointee characteristics 
are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regression. We cluster standard errors at the 
bank-level.  
  The Heckman procedure requires us to identify an instrument in the form of a variable 
that influences the first step (the probability that a bank makes a single external appointment), 
but not the second-step (the appointment announcement CARs). We use the natural logarithm of 
the distance from the bank’s headquarter to an international airport as an instrument (see Adams, 
Akyol and Verwijmeren (2013) for a detailed discussion of this instrument). The economic 
rationale behind this instrument is that banks with better access to a good talent pool are more 
likely to hire externally. Furthermore, holding all else constant, better-located banks are more 
attractive to talented executives and this could motivate them to move to work for the bank. 
Thus, these banks are less constrained in choosing executives and are more likely to hire 
externally. In addition, other than affecting the bank’s access to local director pool, there is no 
reason to believe that this instrument would affect the announcement returns to director 
appointment. Thus, we postulate that this is a suitable instrument for our model.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF SINGLE & EXTERNALLY-HIRED  
EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS 
We first study the characteristics of appointees and banks that make single and externally-hired 
executive appointments. Our model reports the probit estimates where the dependent variable 
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equals 1 if banks make a single external executive appointment and 0 otherwise. This analysis is 
estimated over the population of appointment announcements (which includes our sample of 
single appointment announcements of externally-hired executives as well as single appointment 
announcements of internally-promoted executives and appointment announcements where 
multiple executives are appointed to executive and board positions).  
The explanatory variables we include are appointee-level and bank-level variables. 
Appointee-level variables are the seven appointee characteristics defined as previously. We then 
include bank-specific variables, including bank size, which is the natural logarithm of the bank 
total assets (BANKSIZE); charter value, which is the ratio between the market value of equity 
and book value of equity (CHARTERVALUE); bank liabilities, which is the ratio of total (book) 
liabilities to the book value of equity (LEVERAGE). We further control for bank portfolio risk 
using the ratio of risk-weighted assets to the book value of total assets (PORTFOLIO RISK). We 
also control for the prior bank performance using an accounting-based performance measure: 
return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of net income to total assets. All bank-specific 
variables are lagged at time (t-1). Bank accounting information is collected from fourth quarter 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), i.e. Form FR 9Y-C 
from the Federal Reserve Board database.  
We also include a set of bank governance variables that could have significant impacts on 
the probability of banks making a single external appointment. We include board characteristics, 
such as the total number of executive and non-executive directors on the board (BOARDSIZE), 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board (BOARDIND), and whether the CEO is 
also a chairman (DUALITY). Furthermore, since the nominating committee is responsible for 
searching for and nominating executives, we add a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO sits 
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on the nominating committee and 0 otherwise (CEOINNOMI). When the bank does not have a 
standing nominating committee, CEOINNOMI takes the value of 1. Data on bank governance 
are collected from BoardEx. Finally, we add a dummy variable to indicate whether the incoming 
executive joins as a CEO (CEOPOST) and whether the appointment is made after the 2008 
financial crisis (POST_CRISIS). Table 2 shows the summary statistics and variable definitions. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the variables. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the first-stage probit regression. Consistent with our 
expectations, column 3 of table 4 shows that the natural logarithm of distance to a major airport 
is negatively related to the likelihood of single external appointments (Column 3: = –0.22,        
p< .001) confirming its statistical validity as an instrument. In terms of appointee-level variables, 
the probability of a single external appointment is higher when the appointees possess an Ivy 
League education (Column 1: =0.30, p< .10). This could be because, in deciding between 
different potential candidates, banks tend to look for an unambiguous signal of competence. An 
Ivy League education could easily allow one candidate to stand out from other candidates. In 
addition, a single external appointment is more likely to include appointees with an MBA degree 
(Column 1: =0.50, p< .001) and is less likely to include those having prior executive 
directorship experience (Column 1: = –0.38, p< .001).   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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In terms of bank-level characteristics, our results indicate that the growth prospect of the 
bank, measured by CHARTER VALUE, is inversely related to the likelihood of single external 
appointment (Column 1: = –0.18, p< .01). This finding supports the notion that banks look for 
external human capital when they need someone with new perspectives to enhance their growth 
potential. Finally, banks are less likely to appoint an external candidate to a CEO position 
(Column 1: = –0.56, p< .001). This result is consistent with Cremers and Grinstein (2013), who 
report that external CEO succession is much less common than internal CEO succession in the 
banking industry.  
In essence, along with appointee-level characteristics, bank-level characteristics differ 
systematically for firms that make the single external appointments contained in our sample as 
opposed to other types of appointments. Therefore, not accounting for these differences could 
bias our estimates of the expected performance effects linked to director appointments.  
 
EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Event study methodology  
We use event study methodology to examine the stock market reactions to single and externally-
hired appointment announcements (N=252). Following prior studies on executive appointments, 
we concentrate on the time period immediately surrounding the appointment announcement.  
Specifically, we estimate the following market model:  
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εitt = – 300, …, – 46    (1) 
where Rit are the daily stock returns for firm i at day t and Rmt are equally-weighted CRSP index 
return for day t. We estimate the model parameters using 255 daily return observations starting 
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from 300 to 46 days before the executive announcement date. We specify that there is no other 
executive appointment made during this estimation period. For robustness, we also use a 
different estimation period (–146, –46) and a different market benchmark (Datastream All US 
Banks Index). We construct abnormal returns as the sum of the prediction errors of the market 
model. To test for the statistical significance of the abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), we run the Patell-Z test and the Wilcoxon sign-ranked test.  
 
Event study results  
Table 5 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding single and 
externally-hired executive appointment announcements. CARs are calculated for two-, three-, 
four- and five-day event windows from day –1 to 0, 0 to +2, 0 to +3 and 0 to +4 (0 is the 
appointment date). The choice of event windows is motivated from the observation that the 
appointee is new to investors. Hence, investors require time to do their research on the appointee 
before they could accurately evaluate the appointee’s impact on bank performance. Thus, this is 
likely to take a couple of days until a reliable and market price-moving assessment can be made. 
Table 5 shows that the stock market reaction to the appointment news, on average, is positive. 
Two-day (–1, 0), three-day (0, +2), four-day (0, +3) and five-day (0, +4) CARs are +0.71%, 
+0.31%, +0.47% and +0.99%, respectively. We observe that shorter event windows such as two-
day (–1, 0) or three-day (0, +2) are not statistically significant while longer event window of (0, 
+4) is significant (at 5% level for mean and median significance tests). Hence, this validates our 
expectation that there is a lag in the stock market reaction to the appointment news.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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Although the average CAR is positive, CARs are not always positive. For example, 118 
out of 252 executive appointments (46.8%) are associated with negative returns over 5-day 
window. Therefore, the next sections of this paper will investigate the determinants of stock 
market reactions to single and externally-hired executive announcements.  
 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Appointee characteristics and appointment announcement returns  
In this section, we investigate the relationship between the announcement effects and various 
appointee characteristics. The dependent variables are CAR of 5-day window (0, +4) around the 
announcement of an executive appointment. Appointee characteristics measures are defined as 
previously. We include a set of control variables identical to those in Table 4 to ensure that our 
results on appointee characteristics are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regression.  
Table 6 shows the results of our second-stage regressions against 5-day CAR (%). In 
columns 1, 3, 6 and 8, we show that the stock market returns are positively and significantly 
related to three appointee characteristics: (1) age, (2) number of executive directorships, and (3) 
Ivy League education. The magnitude for each of the coefficient estimates is generally consistent 
across columns. The coefficient estimates indicate that CARs are on average 1.2% higher when 
the appointee is 10 years older, 1.4% higher when the appointee has one prior executive 
directorships position and 3.5% higher when the appointee has an Ivy League education.  
              ---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
With respect to age (Column 1: =0.12, p< .10), among several possible explanations, we argue 
that younger appointees have more incentives to increase their job security by engaging in risky 
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and value-destroying activities. Thus, market investors react less favourably to the appointment 
of a young appointee because they envisage that this appointment will impose an additional 
agency cost to the bank.  
The positive coefficient estimates for number of executive directorships (Column 3: 
=1.36, p< .05) demonstrate that prior experience performing functional tasks as a top executive 
equips the appointee with the most relevant expertise and skills to excel in the new job (Gary & 
Nowland, 2013). We obtain similar estimation results when narrowing the definition of 
‘executive directorships’ to ‘CEO directorships’.  
Columns 2, 5, 7 and 8 show that stock market returns are not affected by three executive 
characteristics: (1) being female, (2) number of non-banking industries, and (3) having an MBA 
degree.
6
 Thus, our findings suggest that the gender of the executive does not matter, in the eyes 
of investors, for their future performance in the bank. However, our insignificant results should 
be interpreted with caution. It is plausible that there is information leakage surrounding the 
appointment of executives, particularly around the appointment of high-profile female 
appointments. Prior to the announcement, there could be speculation about the potential 
candidates and their chances of being appointed. If this is the case, the appointment news would 
not come as a surprise to market investors, which could explain the lack of a reaction on the 
announcement date. Thus, information leakage could undermine the statistical significance of 
some of our estimation coefficients.  
Columns 4 and 8 show that the coefficient estimates for busyness are statistically 
significant and negative (Column 4: = –3.27, p< .01). The magnitude of the coefficient is 
economically large, indicating that CARs are 3.27% lower for each additional non-executive 
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directorship the appointee holds. Hence, investors expect banks appointing busy executives to 
perform significantly worse than those appointing more committed executives.  
The coefficients on the control variables generally have the expected signs. BOARDIND 
is positive and significant (Column 2: = 10.60, p< .05), implying that the board makes better 
executive appointment decisions when it is highly independent. Announcement returns are also 
higher when the banks perform well as indicated by ROA (Column 2: = 1.27, p< .10). By 
contrast, CHARTER VALUE is statistically negative (Column 2: = –2.07, p< .01), 
demonstrating that investors react more positively to single and externally-hired appointments 
when the bank growth rate is low. Thus, investors expect the externally-hired executive to bring 
new perspectives and ideas and improve the bank growth opportunities.  
Another interesting finding is that LAMBDA is statistically positive in several 
specifications (e.g. Column 2: = 7.53, p< .001). Lambda controls for selection bias caused by a 
bank’s decision to make a single external appointment (rather than a different type of 
appointment). The positive coefficient on LAMBDA implies that the factors motivating banks to 
make a single external executive appointment correlate with positive announcement returns and 
that results not controlling for this will be biased.   
 
Alternative specifications and robustness checks  
We repeat the regression analysis in column 8 of Table 6 using different event-study 
specifications. Column 1 of Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates using a 4-day event window 
(0, +3). Column 2 uses a shorter estimation period of (–146, –46) and column 3 uses Datastream 
All US Banks Index (BANKSUS) as an alternative benchmark to calculate abnormal returns. 
Columns 1-3 show that our estimation results are similar to those of the previous section. 
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Overall, our findings are insensitive to choices of event windows, estimation periods and 
benchmark types.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Furthermore, although the text contained in the appointment announcements made by 
banks are standardised, the text in a few announcements might go beyond simply announcing the 
new executive. For example, one announcement in our sample explains that a new chief risk 
officer is appointed because the bank is currently battling with regulatory authorities and needs 
to improve its image after a scandal. Therefore, the stock market reactions could be interspersed 
with information other than those related to the new appointee. We exclude 10 such 
announcements and redo the analysis we did in column 8 of Table 6.
7
 As column 4 of Table 7 
shows, our new coefficient estimates are similar to those obtained previously. In addition, as 
some of the banks appear several times in our working sample, we add bank fixed-effects into 
our model. Column 5 shows that our results remain qualitatively similar to those obtained earlier.  
To show that the estimation results we obtain in Table 6 are non-random, we run a 
placebo test during a 3-day event window (–15, –13). Since this event window is before the 
appointment announcement date, we expect none of the main coefficient estimates to take 
significant values. Column 6 of Table 7 confirms this expectation. This shows that the results we 
obtain in our main analysis in Table 6 are indeed driven by the event of the incoming executive 
appointment.  
 
Does board independence moderate the market valuation of executive characteristics?  
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In Table 8, we examine whether the proportion of non-executive directors (BOARDIND) 
influences the market evaluation of appointee characteristics. More non-executive directors on 
the board implies more monitoring pressure on the top executives. Thus, a board with more non-
executive directors could inhibit executive influence and, thus, diminish the expected 
performance effects linked to the appointee characteristics. To verify this, we include several 
interaction terms which are the products of executive characteristics and the proportion of non-
executive directors, such as BOARDIND*AGE into our regression model.  
Panel A of Table 8 shows that board independence has a statistically negative effect on 
investor evaluation of (1) Ivy League education (= –6.54, p< .05), (2) #executive directorships 
(= –7.12, p< .05) and (3) number of non-banking industries (in which the executive has 
experience) (= –21.78, p< .10). Although insignificant, board independence also exerts a 
negative effect on investor evaluation of executive’s age.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
To further investigate whether board independence diminishes the wealth effects of 
executive characteristics, we construct an F-test, the results of which are displayed in Panel B of 
Table 8. Our results demonstrate that the more a board is dominated by non-executive directors, 
market returns become less affected by characteristics of the executive. This is consistent with 
the prediction that non-executive directors act as monitors to inhibit top executive discretion and 
influence. Thus, when the level of influence of the incoming executive is diminished, their 
characteristics become less relevant to investors. Consequently, in a highly independent board, 
the positive wealth effects of executive characteristics disappear.  
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Overall, we argue that executives are valuable for shareholders except when the board of 
directors is highly independent. In such cases, executives become value irrelevant.  
 
Are CEOs different? 
In Table 9, we examine whether the CEO dummy (CEOPOST) influences the market evaluation 
of appointee characteristics. In our sample of executive appointment announcements, we mix 
CEOs with other executives such as CFOs or CROs. Because the CEO is the most important 
decision maker in the bank, investors might value CEO characteristics differently from those of 
lower-ranked executives. Thus, we include several interaction terms which are the products of 
appointee characteristics and CEO dummy, such as CEOPOST*AGE into our regression model.  
Panel A of Table 9 shows that CEOPOST has a positive effect on investor evaluation of: 
(1) Ivy League education (= 3.77, p< .05) and (2) number of executive directorships (=1.59,    
p< .05). This implies that market investors place additional reward on talented and experienced 
CEOs relative to other executives. By contrast, CEOPOST has a negative effect on investor 
evaluation of (3) busyness (= –10.45, p< .001). Consequently, investors place an additional 
value cost on a CEO who is busy holding too many non-executive directorships. Thus, we 
observe a negative interaction term.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
To further investigate the wealth effects of CEO characteristics, we construct another F-
test in Panel B of Table 9. Panel B shows that the wealth effects of all characteristics are 
enhanced when the appointee joins as a CEO. In essence, our results show that, in the case of 
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CEOs, investors value desirable characteristics more and penalise undesirable characteristics 
more.  
Finally, some appointment announcements entail the appointee also being appointed to 
the board of directors. This happens in most CEO appointments and in some President 
appointments. Since we have already found stronger wealth effects linked to CEO appointment, 
we examine whether hiring mixed with board appointment to non-CEO positions also causes 
larger valuation effects. Overall, the interaction coefficients are insignificant, implying that 
investors do not place additional value on this appointment type. For brevity, we do not report 
the results.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our paper investigates the value of executives to shareholders of US banks by examining the 
stock market reaction to the appointment of new executives. Our argument is that if executives 
are valuable to shareholders, announcement returns will be higher when executives with certain 
desirable characteristics are appointed to a bank. We employ an event study to compute the 
expected performance gains linked to executive characteristics such as age, education and 
experience.  
Using a hand-collected of 252 executive appointments from 1999 to 2011, we 
demonstrate that certain executive characteristics create shareholder wealth. In particular, we 
show that market returns are higher when the appointee is older, has prior experience as an 
executive director or holds an Ivy League degree. By contrast, the appointment of an executive 
who holds multiple non-executive directorships results in negative returns. In addition, the 
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gender of the appointee and experience in non-banking industries do not affect stock market 
returns around the announcement of a new executive.  
More importantly, we show that the level of influence that the appointee is expected to 
exert on the bank moderates the value which shareholders attach to appointee characteristics. We 
first document that the wealth effects disappear or diminish substantially the higher the 
proportion of non-executive directors. This implies that increased board monitoring and 
involvement in board decision making of non-executive directors reduces the influence of the 
incoming executive and therefore diminishes any wealth effects linked to their appointment. In 
addition, our findings demonstrate that the wealth effects are enhanced when the appointee joins 
as a CEO, consistent with the view that the CEO is the most important decision maker in the 
bank.  
Overall, our study complements existing literature on why and how individual executives 
matter for firm performance. Our re
8
sults stress the crucial role of the nominating committee, 
which is responsible for searching and hiring directors (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Our 
results also have important policy implications. First, we echo de Haan and Vlahu (2013) that 
appointing more executives with expertise to the bank is an important policy concern. Our 
findings are consistent with calls by policy makers to appoint more executives that are highly 
qualified and possess relevant industry experience. Second, our study does not show that the 
expected performance effects linked to executives vary by gender. Since it is plausible that there 
is information leakage surrounding the appointment of high-profile female executives, it is 
difficult to rely on the event study results to conclude whether increasing the proportion of 
female executives will affect bank performance. Therefore, our results also highlight the 
difficulty in using event study evidence in the debate concerning gender diversity.   
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Endnotes 
 
 
1
For example, John Stumpf from Wells Fargo and Jamie Dimon from JPMorgan are often cited as successful bank 
executives. See ‘Jamie Dimon, the last King of Wall Street’, Financial Times, 17 May 2013. 
2
We follow Custodio and Metzger (2013) in defining top executives. They include CEO, CFO, COO, CRO, CIO, 
Chairman, President, Division CEO, Division President, Division Chairman, Head of Division, Regional CEO, 
Regional President, and Regional Chairman. 
3
See Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) and de Haan and Vlahu (2013) for a review on recent developments of 
corporate governance literature in the non-financial and financial industries respectively. See also Song and Thakor 
(2006) for an analysis of the advisory role of the boards.  
4
Ivy League institutions are eight North Eastern American higher education institutions, including Brown 
University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, 
University of Pennsylvania and Yale University.  
5
Since investors are already aware of the retirement of the outgoing executive, we argue that the stock market 
reactions to planned retirement announcements are purely driven by the joining event of the incoming executive 
6
 Table 3 indicates a high correlation of 0.56 between the number of non-banking industries and number of current 
non-executive directorships (busyness). Thus, in column 8, we exclude the number of prior non-banking industries 
to prevent the problem of multicollinearity. 
7
 Among the excluded announcements, two contain political sentiments and eight point out the specific rationale 
behind the appointment. The rationales include: stabilising bank operations (two cases), improving bank image after 
the scandal (one case), making aggressive expansion into a new product market or geographical area (five cases). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample distribution  
This table reports the composition of the sample of 658 announcements of executive appointments to 308 US banks 
between 01 January 1999 and 31 December 2011. Based on the information provided in the newspapers 
announcements, we classify the appointment announcements into three categories: (1) single and externally-hired 
appointment announcements, (2) single and internally-promoted appointment announcements, and (3) multiple 
executive appointment announcements. For clarity, we further classify 252 single and externally-hired appointment 
announcements into joining announcements and joining mixed with planned retirement announcements.  
 
 
    Number 
Single and externally-hired appointment announcements    
Joining announcements of the incoming executives 201   
Joining mixed with planned retirement announcements 51  252 
     
Single and internally-promoted appointment announcements   271 
     
Multiple appointment announcements    
All internal candidates  99   
At least one external candidate  36  135 
All    658 
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics  
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in our sample. The sample consists of 252 single 
externally-hired executive appointment announcements to 145 US banks between 01 January 1999 and 31 
December 2011. 
 
 
Variable Definition N Mean SD p1 p99 
Panel A: Executive characteristics      
AGE The age of the appointee 252 49.47 6.54 35.00 66.00 
FEMALE Dummy that equals to 1 if the appointee is a 
female and 0 otherwise. 
252 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
#EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS Number of executive directorships at listed firms 
that the appointee holds prior to joining the bank 
252 0.69 0.86 0.00 4.00 
BUSYNESS Number of non-executive directorships the 
appointee holds at the time of the appointment. 
252 0.06 0.32 0.00 2.00 
#NON-BANKING INDUSTRIES Number of non-banking industries the appointee 
has worked in prior to joining the bank. 
252 0.25 0.80 0.00 5.00 
IVY LEAGUE Dummy that equals to 1 if the appointee obtains at 
least one degree from Ivy League institutions and 0 
otherwise 
252 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
MBA Dummy that equals to1 if the appointee possesses 
an MBA degree and 0 otherwise 
252 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Panel B: Bank characteristics       
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided 
by book value of total assets. 
252 1.26 1.27 -2.63 5.63 
BANKSIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 252 22.84 2.06 19.49 28.41 
PORTFOLIO RISK Risk-weighted assets divided by book value of 
total assets 
252 0.76 0.28 0.03 0.93 
CHARTER VALUE Market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity 
252 1.67 1.06 0.13 4.60 
LEVERAGE Book value of liabilities divided the book value of 
equity 
252 9.95 3.50 1.52 19.68 
BOARDSIZE Number of executive and non-executive directors 
on the board. 
252 12.10 3.58 6.00 21.00 
BOARDIND The proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board. 
252 0.76 0.14 0.25 0.93 
DUALITY Dummy that equals to 1 if the CEO is also a 
Chairman and 0 otherwise 
252 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
CEOINNOM Dummy that equals to 1 if the CEO sits in the 
nominating committee and 0 otherwise 
252 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
CEOPOST CEOPOST equals to 1 if the appointee is 
appointed to a CEO position and 0 otherwise. 
252 0.27 0.43 0.00 1.00 
DISTANCE_AIRPORT The distance from the bank’s headquarter to the 
nearest international airport (miles)  
252 18.23 19.50 0.7 104 
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TABLE 3 
 Correlation matrix  
 
This table presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables used in the regression analysis. All other variables are defined in Table 2. Bold 
coefficients denote statistical significance at 5% level.  
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) 5-day CAR (%) 1.00                   
(2) AGE 0.08 1.00                  
(3) FEMALE 0.00 -0.06 1.00                 
(4) #EXEC DIRECTORSHIPS 0.08 0.22 -0.06 1.00                
(5) BUSYNESS -0.10 0.18 0.05 0.12 1.0               
(6) #NON-BANK INDUSTRIES -0.06 0.17 -0.02 0.22 0.60 1.00              
(7) IVY LEAGUE 0.10 0.11 -0.06 0.03 0.09 0.05 1.00             
(8) MBA 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.09 1.00            
(9) ROA -0.07 -0.27 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 1.00           
(10) BANKSIZE 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.00 0.05 1.00          
(11) PORTFOLIO RISK -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 1.00         
(12) CHARTERVALUE -0.16 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.65 0.02 0.04 1.00        
(13) LEVERAGE 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.19 0.18 0.01 0.00 1.00       
(14) BOARDSIZE 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.14 0.12 0.03 1.00      
(15) BOARDIND 0.08 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.26 0.19 0.06 -0.26 0.02 0.05 1.00     
(16) DUALITY 0.03 -0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 -0.05 1.00    
(17) CEOINNOM 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.16 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.26 -0.04 1.00   
(18) CEOPOST -0.07 0.17 -0.12 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.09 -0.23 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.15 -0.09 -0.22 0.02 1.00  
(19) DISTANCE_AIRPORT -0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.26 0.11 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.09 0.24 1.00 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Probit estimates of probability of single and externally-hired appointments  
 
This table estimates the likelihood that the bank is going to make single and externally-hired appointments. This 
analysis is estimated over the full sample of 658 executive appointment announcements, including single and 
externally-hired appointment announcements (our sample of interest), single and internally-promoted appointment 
announcements, and multiple executive appointment announcements. The dependent variable is a dummy that 
equals to 1 if the bank makes a single and externally-hired appointment. Year fixed-effects are included. All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at 
the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
   Appointee-level characteristics   
AGE -0.01† -0.01 -0.01 
 (-1.69) (-1.47) (-1.49) 
FEMALE -0.36 -0.37 -0.33 
 (-1.55) (-1.58) (-1.39) 
#EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.39*** 
 (-4.04) (-4.15) (-4.19) 
BUSYNESS -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 
 (-1.34) (-1.29) (-1.31) 
#NON-BANKING INDUSTRIES 0.17† 0.17† 0.15 
 (1.84) (1.79) (1.61) 
IVY LEAGUE 0.30† 0.28 0.26 
 (1.75) (1.61) (1.44) 
MBA 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 
 (4.40) (4.48) (4.57) 
   Bank-level characteristics    
ROA 0.08 0.09 0.09 
 (1.35) (1.41) (1.44) 
BANKSIZE -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
 (-0.59) (-0.44) (-1.20) 
PORTFOLIO RISK
 
0.17 0.16 0.14 
 (1.24) (1.17) (0.97) 
CHARTERVALUE -0.18** -0.18* -0.18* 
 (-2.59) (-2.39) (-2.39) 
LEVERAGE -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.83) (-0.81) (-0.81) 
BOARDSIZE -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.35) (-1.27) (-1.04) 
BOARDIND 0.61 0.39 0.38 
 (1.42) (0.82) (0.79) 
DUALITY -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 
 (-1.28) (-1.45) (-1.28) 
CEOINNOM 0.33† 0.42* 0.46* 
 (1.82) (2.05) (2.21) 
CEOPOST -0.56*** -0.57*** -0.52*** 
 (-4.02) (-4.01) (-3.66) 
POST_CRISIS 0.06 -0.14 -0.15 
 (0.41) (-0.28) (-0.30) 
DISTANCE_AIRPORT   -0.22*** 
   (-3.96) 
Year fixed-effects No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 11.73% 12.58% 14.19% 
Observations 658 658 658 
 TABLE 5 
The stock market reaction to announcements of single and externally-hired appointments  
 
This table shows the stock price reactions to 252 single and externally-hired executive appointment announcements 
to 145 US banks between 01 January 1999 and 31 December 2011. We report abnormal returns for different event 
windows surrounding executive appointment announcements. In addition to the mean and the median abnormal 
return, we also report the Patell-Z test, the Wilcoxon sign-raked test and the percentage of positive abnormal returns. 
The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Event window N Average CAR (%) Patell-Z Median CARs Sign-ranked % Positive CARs 
-1 to  0 day  252 0.71 1.14 0.18 0.99 52.8 
 0 to + 2 day 252 0.31 0.55 -0.16 0.07 48.0 
 0 to + 3 day 252 0.47 0.74 0.14 0.49 52.0 
 0 to + 4 day 252 0.99 1.96* 0.24 1.65* 53.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 6 
Appointee characteristics and stock market reactions to executive appointments 
 
This table reports the results of multivariate Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to the 
announcements of single and externally-hired executive appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-
day CAR (%). POST_CRISIS equals to 1 if year is 2008-2011 and 0 otherwise. LAMBDA represents the inverse 
Mill’s ratio of the first stage probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externally-
hired executive appointment announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. All other variables are 
defined in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AGE 0.12†       0.13* 
 (1.77)       (1.99) 
FEMALE  -0.76      1.21 
  (-0.44)      (0.79) 
#EXEC DIRECTORSHIPS   1.36*     1.53** 
   (2.43)     (2.89) 
BUSYNESS    -3.27**    -3.91*** 
    (-2.60)    (-3.46) 
#NON-BANK INDUSTRIES     -0.34   - 
     (-0.80)   - 
IVY LEAGUE      3.52*  2.15† 
      (2.12)  (1.65) 
MBA       1.83 -1.42 
       (1.56) (-1.62) 
ROA 0.60 1.27† 0.43 1.22† 1.24† 1.20† 1.34† 0.58 
 (0.93) (1.85) (0.67) (1.78) (1.81) (1.72) (1.92) (0.86) 
BANKSIZE -0.18 -0.41 -0.17 -0.27 -0.37 -0.54* -0.43† -0.20 
 (-0.82) (-1.60) (-0.88) (-1.07) (-1.43) (-2.01) (-1.66) (-0.91) 
PORTFOLIO RISK -0.45 0.01 -0.58 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.08 -0.78 
 (-0.45) (0.01) (-0.56) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.04) (0.06) (-0.68) 
CHARTERVALUE -1.11† -2.07** -0.86 -2.02** -2.04** -2.09** -2.11** -0.98 
 (-1.66) (-3.01) (-1.39) (-2.90) (-2.97) (-3.07) (-3.03) (-1.64) 
LEVERAGE 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.08 
 (0.63) (0.10) (0.74) (0.03) (0.13) (-0.03) (0.12) (0.74) 
BOARDSIZE 0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.19
†
 
 (0.89) (-0.06) (1.18) (0.19) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.21) (1.70) 
BOARDIND 5.79 10.60* 3.75 9.95* 10.48* 10.34* 10.35* 4.49 
 (1.42) (2.49) (0.97) (2.34) (2.46) (2.45) (2.42) (1.16) 
CEOINNOM 0.36 -0.61 0.43 -0.73 -0.71 -0.80 -0.81 0.33 
 (0.43) (-0.59) (0.51) (-0.70) (-0.67) (-0.79) (-0.77) (0.36) 
DUALITY 0.60 1.54 0.25 1.79 1.58 1.67 1.65 0.66 
 (0.29) (0.66) (0.13) (0.78) (0.68) (0.76) (0.71) (0.34) 
CEOPOST -0.68 -4.09* 0.03 -3.81* -4.03* -4.42* -4.48* -0.12 
 (-0.41) (-2.07) (0.02) (-1.97) (-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.21) (-0.09) 
POST_CRISIS -4.41 -7.74† -4.69 -7.04† -7.73† -7.72† -7.70† -4.76 
 (-1.21) (-1.82) (-1.33) (-1.67) (-1.83) (-1.83) (-1.81) (-1.33) 
LAMBDA 0.08 7.51*** -1.77 7.21*** 7.46*** 7.45*** 7.77*** -1.90* 
 (0.03) (4.40) (-1.21) (4.12) (4.70) (4.39) (4.68) (2.34) 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Single external appointments 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R-Squared 9.56% 8.60% 9.87% 10.93% 9.11% 9.66% 8.58% 16.36% 
 
 
 TABLE 7 
Additional evidence on the value of appointee characteristics  
 
This table reports the results of multivariate Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to the 
announcements of single and externally-hired appointments for different specifications. Column 1 reports the 
coefficient estimates for an alternative event window of (0, +3). Column 2 reports the coefficient estimates for an 
alternative estimation period of (-146, -46). Column 3 reports the coefficient estimates using an alternative 
benchmark of Datastream US banks Index (BANKSUS). Column 4 excludes announcements that contain 
sentiments. Column 5 adds bank fixed-effects into our model. Column 6 performs a placebo regression on event 
window (-15, -13). Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. For brevity, we 
do not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR 
(0, +3) 
Estimation 
period 
(-146, -46) 
Datastream 
US banks 
index 
Non-
sentimental 
Bank 
Fixed-effects 
Placebo 
CARs 
(-15, -13) 
 AGE 0.13* 0.17* 0.08† 0.13† 0.23** 0.02 
  (2.49) (2.09) (1.84) (1.98) (2.84) (0.20) 
 GENDER 1.13 -0.08 0.99 1.25 3.13 1.47 
  (0.86) (-0.05) (0.73) (0.80) (1.56) (0.45) 
 #EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS 1.34** 1.85** 0.47 1.49** 1.13 0.45 
  (2.96) (2.73) (1.42) (2.79) (0.77) (0.13) 
 BUSYNESS -3.84*** -3.72* -1.77** -3.97*** -6.10*** -0.25 
  (-3.22) (-2.53) (-2.82) (-3.51) (-5.12) (-0.25) 
 IVY LEAGUE 2.01† 2.17 1.80* 1.81 0.86 0.34 
  (1.69) (1.59) (1.97) (1.36) (0.71) (0.39) 
 MBA -0.93 -1.73 -0.57 -1.48† -2.53 -0.86 
  (-1.23) (-1.49) (-0.84) (-1.66) (-1.17) (-0.18) 
 Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Single external appointments 252 252 252 242 252 252 
 R-Squared 21.23% 15.06% 14.58% 13.30% 69.43% 7.12% 
 TABLE 8 
Appointee characteristics, board independence and  
stock market reactions to executive appointments  
 
This table reports the results of multivariate Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to 
announcements of single and externally-hired appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-day CAR 
(%). CHARACTERISTIC refers to the appointee characteristic shown in the column specification. BOARDIND is 
the proportion of non-executive directors on a board. LAMBDA represents the inverse Mill’s ratio of the first stage 
probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externally-hired executive appointment 
announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in brackets. For brevity, we do 
not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 AGE FEMALE 
# EXEC 
DIRECTORSHIPS 
BUSYNESS 
# NON 
BANKING 
IVY 
LEAGUE 
MBA 
Panel A: Regression results 
BOARDIND*CHARACTERISTIC -0.11 17.00 -7.12* 4.95 -6.54* -10.48† 3.89 
 (-0.21) (1.42) (-2.09) (0.29) (-2.26) (-1.82) (0.70) 
CHARACTERISTIC 0.20 -14.12 6.87 -7.26 4.91* 10.14* -1.15 
 (0.48) (-1.43) (0.82) (-0.56) (2.22) (2.26) (-0.25) 
BOARDIND 11.12 10.06** 8.51 9.81** 7.06* 7.38** 8.54 
 (0.44) (2.39) (0.52) (2.32) (2.32) (2.67) (1.62) 
LAMBDA 0.09 7.51*** -1.97 7.20*** 7.52*** 7.31*** 7.78*** 
 (0.04) (4.51) (-0.07) (4.07) (4.61) (4.62) (4.72) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Single external appointments 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R-Squared 9.58% 8.68% 10.23% 11.09% 9.11% 11.45% 8.65% 
Panel B: H0 = BOARDIND*CHARACTERISTIC + CHARACTERISTIC = 0 
F-test 0.52 1.07 0.13 0.33 1.33 0.01 2.92† 
Prob> Chi
2
 (0.47) (0.30) (0.72) (0.57) (0.25) (0.94) (0.09) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 9 
Appointee characteristics, CEO dummy and stock market reactions to executive appointments 
 
This table reports the results of multivariate Heckman (1979) regression analyses of stock market reactions to 
announcements of single and externally-hired appointments. The dependent variables of all models are 5-day CAR 
(%). CHARACTERISTIC refers to the appointee characteristic shown in the column specification. CEOPOST 
equals to 1 if the appointee is appointed to a CEO position and 0 otherwise. LAMBDA represents the inverse Mill’s 
ratio of the first stage probit regression that estimates the likelihood of the bank making a single externally-hired 
executive appointment announcement. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. For brevity, we do not show the control variables. The symbols ***, **, *, † denote significance at the 
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AGE # EXEC  
DIRECTORSHIPS 
BUSYNESS # NON-
BANKING 
IVY 
LEAGUE 
MBA 
Panel A: Regression results  
CEOPOST*CHARACTERISTIC -0.04 1.59* -10.45*** -0.81 3.77* 1.79 
 (-0.24) (2.03) (-4.13) (-0.33) (2.10) (0.81) 
CHARACTERISTIC 0.12† 0.74† -2.77* -0.52 1.19 1.51 
 (1.75) (1.68) (-2.43) (-0.95) (1.33) (1.29) 
CEOPOST 1.46 -1.47 -3.47* -0.47 -2.05* -5.40* 
 (0.17) (-1.40) (-1.96) (-0.37) (-2.19) (-2.07) 
LAMBDA 0.08 -1.77 7.22*** 7.42*** 7.42*** 7.77*** 
 (0.03) (-1.21) (4.36) (4.04) (4.61) (4.71) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Single external appointments 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R-Squared 9.58% 9.88% 12.44% 9.13% 10.17% 8.96% 
Panel B: H0 = CEOPOST*CHARACTERISTIC + CHARACTERISTIC = 0 
F-test 0.24 9.21** 27.61*** 0.30 9.27** 1.90 
Prob> Chi
2 
(0.62) (0.00) (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
